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Development assistance and the CDM – how
to interpret ‘financial additionality’
MICHAEL DUTSCHKE and AXEL MICHAELOWA*
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA),
Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20347 Hamburg, Germany
ABSTRACT. International climate negotiations have specified that projects under the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) should not lead to a ‘diversion’ of official
development assistance (ODA). It is however unchallenged that ODA can be used in
capacity building for the CDM. Diversion can be interpreted in purpose, sectoral, and
regional terms. There are possibilities to use ODA benchmarks to define diversion such as
the UN 0.7 per cent target but they are unlikely to be politically acceptable. On the project
level, three main options exist but none of them is perfect. The Development Assistance
Committee of OECD endorses deduction of the value of emissions credits (CERs) from
ODA. This however leads to a long-term pressure on the ODA level. Differentiating an
ODA-financed baseline project and a ‘piggyback’ CDM option is likely to be arbitrary in
many circumstances. Even if CERs do not accrue for the ODA share of the investment,
still private CDM projects are crowded out due to the subsidizing of CDM projects.
1. Introduction
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) specified in Article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol has the double aim of fostering sustainable development
in developing countries and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Under
the CDM, industrialized countries (the group mentioned in annex B of the
Kyoto Protocol) receive emission credits (‘Certified Emission Reductions’,
CERs) for emission reductions achieved through projects in developing
countries. As the CDM enhances the emissions budgets of annex B
countries, it is important that the corresponding reductions would not have
occurred in the absence of the respective emission mitigation projects. This
issue is commonly termed ‘additionality’ and has its base in Art. 12 (5c),
which states ‘emission reduction [shall be] additional to those that would
have happened in the absence of the certified project activity’. Financial
additionality is one element of the additionality concerns; it originally
meant that no public money that would have been spent anyway on
climate-related action in developing countries could be relabelled as CDM.
This originates in the fear of LDCs that the continuation of ODA flows
could be linked to their acceptance of CDM projects. Ever since Kyoto,
Japan had shown its intent to use official development assistance (ODA)
for CDM projects and also the EU Commission (1999: 11) accepted use
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of ODA by stating that ‘official development finance and GEF should
only be supplementary to private funding. . . . ODA within the framework
of [the] CDM . . . would have to be targeted to areas where the public
sector has a comparative advantage over private investment and where
additional social benefits are to be expected’. But the Commission also
made it clear that ODA should not be used to finance the acquisition of
CERs (ibid.: 12). In the negotiation of the CDM text in 2000, the G77 and
India asked for CDM funds to be additional to ODA, while the Umbrella
Group and the EU in a rare accord developed a new term ‘diversion’ of
ODA that should be avoided (UNFCCC, 2000: 39). When the Parties to
the UN Climate Convention met in Marrakech in late 2001 to define the
detailed CDM rules, the very broad Umbrella–EU definition for financial
additionality prevailed. It states that ‘public funding for clean development
mechanismprojects fromParties inAnnex I is not to result in thediversionof
official development assistance and is to be separate from and not counted
towards the financial obligations of Parties included in Annex I’ (Preamble
of Decision 17/CP.7, UNFCCC, 2001: 20). Besides official development
assistance (ODA), the cited paragraph relates to the Parties’ contributions
to the Global Environmental Facility (GEF).
Despite the flurry around CDM project development, up to the present
little attention has been given to the practicalities of the relation between
ODA and CDM. The Development Assistance Committee of the OECD
negotiated this issue for the last two years and at its high-level meeting on
15–16 April, 2004 took the following decision:
‘We agree that the value of any Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) received
in connection with an ODA-financed CDM project should lead to a deduction
of the equivalent value from ODA, irrespective of whether the CERs are
sold or retained by the donor. We also rule out the possibility of counting
as ODA funds used to purchase CERs. We request the DAC’s expert groups on
environment and statistics to continue work to clarify remaining unresolved
issues and formulate a practical approach in time for the next reporting cycle.
This approach would be subject to review within three years. (OECD 2004)’
Whether thisdecisionwill be acceptedby theCDMExecutiveBoard remains
to be seen. In the current article, ODA is understood to consist of technical
cooperation and financial cooperation. Compared with financial cooper-
ation, the monetary volumes (and carbon revenues) from technical co–
operation are usually rather small. Financial cooperation is typically
channelled through the host country’s central bank, which then distributes
loans to local banks for financing concretely identified projects. Financial
cooperation agencies like the German KfW stress that the terms of these
loans shall reflect market conditions.1 These conditions are in many cases
hypothetical, as long- or medium-term loans would otherwise not be
available.2
1 Personal communication Joseph Gamperl, 9 April 2003.
2 In the case of the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund, the Brazilian Plantar
project under market conditions would have received a loan with a duration of
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We start by defining the term ‘diversion’ for the purpose of the subject.
Then we study proposals for a benchmark approach, followed by options to
interpret diversion at the project level. Even in this latter case, our focus is
on the aggregate consequence on the amount of CERs generated and on the
regional allocation of CDM projects. In conclusion, we give concrete policy
recommendations on how to find suitable international regulations that
could guide the DAC in its implementation and review of the April 2004
decision. Moreover, we give recommendations for development assistance
agencies to deal with this issue.
2. What is diversion?
In order to understand the concerns expressed in the discussion around
financial additionality, we shall first define types of potential diversion.
These are (1) diversion of purpose, (2) sectoral diversion, and (3) regional
diversion. These are not clear-cut distinctions, but rather they look at the
problem of diversion from different angles. Any regulation concerning
financial additionality can result in one or more diversion risks.
2.1. Diversion of purpose
If ODA is used for direct acquisition of certified emission reductions (CERs),
while still being reported as ODA, its original purpose may not be pursued
any longer. For any single case, this argument may be difficult to sustain,
because both CDM and ODA have the objective to further sustainable
development of the target country (Kete et al., 2001: 5). If a host country
does not endorse a project, it will not produce CERs. The risk however
is that ODA might directly or indirectly be tied to the execution of CDM
projects (ibid.: 8). Furthermore, climate change is not a top priority for many
developing countries, given more pertinent concerns about food and water
security and poverty alleviation. Mitigation projects may have combined
goals, but climate projects will not necessarily be the most efficient use
for the solution for the above-mentioned problems. The ‘Copenhagen
Consensus’, a theoretical exercise led by climate sceptic Bjørn Lomborg
(2004), has ranked the cost efficiency of different ODA projects. Highest
ranks are given to HIV and malaria control, provision of micronutrients,
and trade liberalization. Climate mitigation and adaptation measures are
lowest on the list.
2.2. Sectoral diversion
Similarly to the diversion of purpose, ODA investment could preferably be
led into sectors that are most likely to produce CERs, such as waste disposal
or large-scale energy production, while the most pressing necessities may
lie in other areas, such as social infrastructure and education.
one year and an interest rate of 20 per cent. When presenting the PCF’s carbon
purchase contract, the bank increased duration to six years, and brought down
the interest rate to 6 per cent.
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2.3. Regional diversion
The incentive of gaining carbon credits could also divert ODA investment
to countries where those projects are most likely to be successfully
implemented. This could relate as well to mitigation potentials as to
administrative capacities. One part of this concern is certainly participation
in the climate regime. Currently, most of the African nations have
not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which makes them ineligible for the
CDM. Actually, much ODA investment is directed into national and
regional capacity building. Nevertheless, should ODA flows depend on
the recipient’s active participation in the Climate Convention?
3. Why should ODA come into the CDM?
If the risk of diversion is there, why then should ODA be used under the
CDM?
It is not controversial today that ODA operates in the field of CDM
institution and capacity building, such as in the case of the World Bank
initiated National Strategy Studies (NSS). These activities are financed
on a bilateral basis and create the framework for successful project
implementation. One result of these studies is a CDM project pipeline. The
development of complete project documents is only one step further, which
is actually undertaken by the cooperation agencies of several countries (e.g.
Canada and Germany), but this effectively moves into a grey zone where
ODA might subsidize implementation.
The rationale for looking into direct ODA involvement in CDM projects
is that it may increase the chance to attract private sector investment in
neglected regions and in specific project types and modalities with a high
contribution to sustainable development, butwhichwould not be profitable
enough for private investment alone. This may be due to the high CDM
transaction costs, to a lack of institutional capacity, to the small project
size, to the large number of stakeholders, or to the fact that in terms
of CO2 reduction the options favoured by the host country are not the
most profitable ones. If ODA agencies were not allowed to participate
in this process, decades of valuable project experience would be lost. In
certain cases during the AIJ phase,3 ODA grants to projects were even
withdrawn in order to allow turning them into carbon projects (Dutschke
and Michaelowa, 1997: 36). As with foreign direct investment, the bulk of
private sector investment in the CDM will probably go to three countries,
China, India, and Brazil (Halsnaes, 2002: 26). This concentration will be
extremely high in the first commitment period, because of the low expected
CER demand. ODA could help balance this unfair division of resources
and mitigate against perceived country risks. In least developed countries,
ODA may leverage private CDM investment. Furthermore, ODA has the
chance to promote project types the private sector would rather not invest
in, especially small community-based projects and advanced technology
developments (Kete et al., 2001: 6).
3 AIJ (Activities Implemented Jointly) was a test phase for emission reduction
projects in developing countries and countries in transition between 1995 and
2001. The projects did not generate any emissions credits.
Environment and Development Economics 239
There are thus good arguments in favour of combining public and private
funding for theCDM. In the next section,we shall see how regulations could
be designed to address ODA involvement.
4. Options for avoiding ODA diversion
The discussion on how to avoid ODA diversion through the CDM moves
between two extreme cases. One is to simply ignore the diversion rule,
arguing that it is only expressing an intention, without any practical
consequences. This case will not be considered, as we think it runs counter
to the intention of the Marrakech Accords. The other is to disallow any
involvement of ODA funding into the CDM. This would probably lead to
circumvention strategies, like granting ODA funds to NGOs or defining the
focus of ODA programmes in a way that single CDM projects can indirectly
obtain ODA finance made available to host country institutions in a broader
context.
There are principally two ways to look at diversion, the macro and the
micro level. The macro approach consists in observing the country level
and needs to define a baseline for ODA ‘without CDM’, be it for the donor,
be it for the host country. The micro-level approach observes likely changes
in ODA flows based on project opportunities.
4.1. An ODA baseline
Jusen Asuka proposes an ODA baseline, beyond which ODA could
participate in the CDM. His methodology is guided by two criteria:
‘(1) There will be no reduction in the overall ODA flow from developed
countries to developing countries. (2) In the overall aid projects portfolio
of an industrialized country there should be no crowding out of regular
ODA projects by global warming mitigation projects’ (Asuka, 2000). A
third criterion (3) should be environmental additionality: climate change
mitigation projects might already be the business-as-usual case for ODA. In
this respect, what has been common practice in the last years will under the
CDM eventually generate extra credits and thereby inflate annex B carbon
budgets.
Criterion (1) is acting on a very large scale. As public expenditures are
more determined by business cycles and the resulting state income, they
are quite erratic over time. It could be a valid option to allow proceeds
from ODA to be realized only under the condition that ODA budgets are
at least maintained at the level of previous periods (e.g. over five years). A
less stringent approach would be to observe ODA receipts of the individual
host country by the implementing donor. It could require ODA directed to
the host country from the individual donor to increase by the same amount
publicly invested under the CDM. This approach could still lead to regional
diversion.
If, in contrast, the compliance with the Millenium Goal for industrialized
countries to give 0.7 per cent of their GNP as ODA were a prerequisite
for investing ODA funds into the CDM, this would limit CDM investment
eligibility to just four donor countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden) and multilateral donors like the World Bank. Under the
actual demand, ODA expenditures will certainly not be increased only
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for being able to sponsor CDM projects. This option would thus be nearly
as restrictive as the option of total ODA prohibition under the CDM.
Criterion (2) ‘no crowding out’ is near impossible to monitor. Even in
the absence of CER incentives, donor countries could increasingly ask
for ODA contributions to mitigation and adaptation, in which case no
diversion of purpose would take place. Overall, there are no ‘regular ODA
projects’.
Monitoring criterion (3) would require a quantification of GHG effects
of business-as-usual ODA projects. This has been done for the World Bank,
whose investment in emission-intensive technology between 1992 and 1997
was found to be 100 times higher than the GEF budget during the same
period (Sustainable Energy and Economy Network et al., 1997: 5). Thus,
World Bank involvement in climate change mitigation is hardly suspect
of being non-additional. A graduation approach could also be applied.
Assuming 20per cent ofODA in thepreviousperiodwere spent on activities
that have a high impact in climatemitigation, anyCDMinvestment could be
regarded as 20 per cent non-additional. Over time, and as climatemitigation
measures under ODA increased, CDM investment would slowly be phased
out.
4.2. CER value deducted from ODA
As suggested by the DAC, in order to decrease the incentive for diversion,
CER revenues could be deducted from the net aid disbursement in
the period they accrue. The investor country can then either sell them
immediately or put them in the national registry. In order to avoid the
perverse incentive for the investor country to sell its CERs below their
value, they need in every case to be valued based on actual market prices
by the time they are certified. A particular price index needs to be chosen
in advance on an international level.
The higher the CER revenue, the lower the total amount of ODA spent
over the lifetime of the project. If the CER revenues are higher than the
initial investment, ODA becomes negative.
As for the market effects of this regulation, let us assume that under a
business-as-usual case, there is a stable amount ofODA funds for renewable
energy and energy efficiency projects. In fact, since the UN Summit on
Environment and Development in 1992, the share of ODA going into such
projects has strongly increased. This in itself could be seen as sectoral
diversion of ODA as recipients may have preferred other uses.
In this case, ODA funds can be used for CDM projects and all renewable
energy, energy efficiency, or afforestation projects are now labelled CDM.
We have to distinguish two extreme cases:
1 All CERs accrue to the donor country. ODA will increase during
investment and later decrease as shown in figure 1. Only if politicians
decide to channel the CER receipts back to the ODA budget, is there
no net ODA decrease over time.
2 All CERs accrue to the host country. ODA remains constant, ceteris
paribus.
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Figure 2. Private and ODA-financed CDM projects
The impact on emissions budgets depends on the characteristics of ODA-
financed CDM projects. We base the subsequent analysis on the following
assumption: CDM projects financed by ODA will typically have higher
implementation costs than privately organized projects, as they want to
provide development benefits (figure 2). This does not necessarily mean
that only high-cost mitigation measures are financed by ODA, but ODA
finance covers country risks private investors would not be disposed to
shoulder on their own. Otherwise no ODA would be needed as the private
sector would take up these projects anyway, and ODA engagement would
only lead to crowding-out private sector investment. In case of private–
public partnerships (PPP), ODA commitment works as a subsidy.
The effect on the market depends on who gets the CERs, the investor
(figure 3) or the host country (figure 4).
As ODA projects are more expensive than the market price, there will be
no change in the market. For the investor country, spending ODA is bad
business, as it could get the CERs cheaper at the market.










Figure 3. Investor country gets CERs









Figure 4. Host country gets CERs
If the host country gets the CERs, the picture changes completely. It
receives the CERs at zero cost, if the project is fully grant-financed and at
low costs for concessional financing, and thus the supply curve shifts to the
right. Price falls from pp to pODA and CERs rise from Qp to QODA. Private
projects are crowded out and the revenue of the remaining ones falls. The
CDM gains market share compared with Annex-I domestic compliance,
which is however of no concern under the perspective of the non-diversion
clause.
4.3. No credits for the ODA share of investment
If in the previous option, the CERs’ value was deducted from ODA, CERs
could as well be deducted according to the ODA share of investment.
This could be done by the certifier (designated operational entity – DOE),
provided the CDM Executive Board should wish to add a rule in this sense.
As an alternative, the investor country could definitively retire the relating
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CERs from the market. In this case, ODA may leverage private investment,
but the donor country’s incentive for ODA to be invested in CDM projects
will not be as high as in option 2 above.
Project proponents will ask for a high grant element, as ODA with a low
grant element will lead to the same reduction in CER as ODA with a high
grant element. For illustration, consider the following case.
A small-scale wind power project of 1 MW costs €1 million and gets an
ODA loan with an interest rate of 10 per cent over ten years, equivalent to
€100,000 annually. Assuming an increase in the CER value to €5, and an
annual CER generation of 6,000 t of CO2 reduction, the return from CDM
will amount to €30,000. For the project owner, taking an ODA loan will
thus imply opportunity costs of €30,000 per year. The fact that the grant
element of the loan is at least 25 per centwhen going to the central bankdoes
not necessarily mean that the CDM investor receives the same conditions.
On the contrary, financial cooperation agencies pretend to mirror market
conditions for the borrower, in order not to introduce market distortions.
If the investor has a realistic choice to obtain a commercial loan, he will
negotiate conditions for the ODA loan to compensate his opportunity costs
due to the loss of CERs. He will now only take up the ODA loan if its net
costs compared with a loan at market rates are at least €30,000 lower than
the ones of a market loan. Here, he will ask, as a compensation, to receive
a grant element of at least 15 per cent if the grant element threshold of
25 per cent is calculated at the level of the central bank.
The question arising from this example is whether the loan is in this
case to be considered ODA or not. The central bank receives a higher grant
element in order to guarantee for the general country and special currency
risks. The German KfW asks recipient central banks to re-invest benefits, if
they accrue from the differential between the conditions offered by KfW to
the central bank and those offered by the central bank to the investor into
development projects. Thus, this amount cannot be considered diverted
from ODA. Therefore, we propose to measure the ODA share at the project
andnot at the central bank level. In our example, thismeans that the investor
will get the CERs as long as the grant element stays below 25 per cent. As
he loses the CERs at a higher value of the grant element, he will decline any
loan with a grant element between 25 and 40 per cent.4
4.4. Distinction between baseline project and CDM ‘add-on’
Here it is assumed that a baseline project (e.g. a coal power plant) would
have been funded through ODA anyway and a CDM portion (e.g. the
improvement of efficiency due to use of a more advanced technology) can
be defined. ODA may not be used for the CDM portion. Diversion of ODA
on a macro level (towards projects that are suitable baseline projects to
‘piggyback’ CDM projects) would be likely.
Problems arise in defining the baseline project. The following options are
possible:
4 As the total volume of loan and interest amounts to €2 million,€30,000 loss per
annum equals 15 per cent of loan value.
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1 The baseline project is the macroeconomically most attractive solution.
This is the incremental cost principle applied by the GEF. It has
encountered numerous implementation problems.
2 The baseline project is the commercially most attractive solution.
This would require the determination of the most attractive
investment which may be difficult (compare the debate on investment
additionality, Greiner and Michaelowa, 2003)
3 The baseline project is the project planned on the site before the CDM
idea came in. However in the future, planning will consider the CDM
option from the outset
The West Nile hydropower project of the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon
Fund has a US$3.7 million ODA component; it was argued that this
component was necessary to overcome the barrier that commercial
financing is not available for projects in that region (PCF, 2000: 6f).
5. Discussion
The ODA baseline approach is not adequate to identify diversion. Sectoral
and regional diversion of ODA can happen due to intervening factors
other than CDM involvement. As host countries take increasing stakes
in allocation of ODA funds, there is no sense in fixing the quota over an
indefinite time in the future.ODAbaseline approaches can thus be a starting
point to avoid Annex B budget inflation, but they cannot prevent diversion.
We should therefore study the consequences at a macro level of additional
sets of criteria that are related to individual projects.
Deducting the CER reflow from ODA will lower investor country’s
interest in diverting ODA. As it is common sense that ODA should not
directly acquire CERs, the rule decided upon by the OECD Development
Assistance Committee constitutes the minimal consensus. In order to avoid
reflow, there are two alternatives. One is that the CERs remain in the host
country. As the host country is free to reinvest the returns from their sale
into national priority areas, theoretically diversion is ruled out. Practically,
there may be under-the-counter deals that allow the investor to acquire
these credits at a price below their market value. The other alternative is
to grant the ODA share of carbon returns to the private investor directly,
which is to be considered a subsidy and may in future lead to conflict with
WTO rules. Another way to deduct ODA from the CERs produced is that
the investor country temporarily retains or definitively retires the ODA
share of the credits from the market as a voluntary action. Alternatively,
the Executive Board could decide to reduce the number of credits certified
accordingly.As in the case ofdeducting theODAshare fromODAreporting,
in the case of financial assistance it is hard to tell the grant element within
the financing package. In technical cooperation, activities in institution and
capacity building will result in increased CER production, without a direct
link to it. Under this aspect, the OECD decision leaves much room for
debate.
The last option, a hypothetical ODA baseline project will lead to a second
baseline for CDM projects. The ODA baseline would be the ODA project in
the absence of the CDM incentive, while the commercial CDM baseline
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would be no financing whatsoever for the project. The ODA baseline
assumes the ODA project would have occurred within the same sector,
in which case diversion had not happened anyway, and no diversion needs
to be prevented. Additionally, as ODA is not necessarily linked to economic
rationality, the ODA baseline would open all gates for subjectivity.
Given the complex situation, it is very likely that the Executive Board will
delegate the ultimate decision toCOP 10, on the occasion of its decision over
the El Zafarana wind project in Egypt (Buen, 2004).
6. Conclusions and recommendations
In this paper, we have discussed how to operationalize the term ‘diversion
of ODA’. We distinguish overlapping categories of diversion of purpose,
sectoral and regional diversions. Means of addressing the different types
of diversion can be grouped in benchmark approaches and project-level
regulations, both of which might be combined.
Among the benchmark options, only the orientation towards the
0.7 per cent of GNP UN target can be determined easily by the end of each
year. Even though an increased pressure to fulfill this target is desirable,
the political feasibility of this proposal is negligible, given that only four
investor countries plus multilateral agencies would be eligible to use the
CDM. The other practical option is to compare annual national donors’
ODA expenditures with previous periods to be determined. This option
requires a high amount of data availability and aggregation, but it does not
prevent regional diversion either.
There is thus no perfect option for regulating ODA use for CER
acquisition. Most options only address one or two types of diversion and
disregard others.
 Deduction of CER value leads to long-term pressure on ODA flows to the
extent that the CERs are not given to the host country.
 Distinguishing between an ODA-financed baseline project and a CDM
‘add-on’ opens Pandora’s box of baseline determination.
 While the non-accrual of CERs to ODA-financed project activities avoids
diversion of ODA, it still leads to a crowding out of private sector CDM
projects, a problem that even more characterises the other options.
The highest number of CERs would have undoubtedly been produced
under the unrestricted use of ODA within CDM projects, which in our
view lead to ODA diversion, is not consistent with the Marrakech Accords,
and thus correctly was ruled out by DAC. On the other hand, we think that
the DA was right in not totally prohibiting ODA use in the context of CDM
projects, as both have complementary aims. We think a rule according to
which the ODA share of financing is not allowed to generate CERs, would
limit interest to use ODA in the CDM, while not necessarily leading to
a total retreat of the ODA from CDM. On the one hand, it is sufficiently
conservative to not predetermine practices that may lead to future conflict.
On the other hand, it allows for a reasonable involvement of development
agencies into the CDM, to the benefit of projects that contribute to the host
countries’ sustainable development.
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Ultimately, and in the absence of an impartial criterion for diversion, a
practical approach would be to ask for a joint declaration for every ODA co-
financedproject bydonor andhost country thatODAdiversion is not taking
place. One might think that the host country could see itself forced to accept
ODA involvement in CDM projects. On the other hand, at least the larger
CDM host countries have an incentive to care for their credibility within
the developing countries’ group of G77 and China. Several prospective
host countries have already declared they would not be giving host country
approval toODAfinancedprojects (Buen, 2004). If consistently the bigCDM
host countries refrain from ODA financing in order to maintain their public
image within the negotiations, at least the risk of regional diversion could
be mitigated. As with the host countries, also investor countries are not
representing homogeneous interests. Development assistance ministries
competing for funding with other ministries, they may also not be willing
to certify non-diversion at all costs.
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